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Short abstract. Why do human individuals compete to provide other individuals with 
information? Standard ways of explaining the evolutionary emergence of language fail 
to find a selection pressure for massive information exchange that would concern our 
species exclusively. I suggest that by talking, human individuals advertise their 
alertness and their ability to get informed. This behavior evolved as a social signaling 
device in a context of generalized insecurity that is unique to our species.  
Abstract. Human beings are talkative. What advantage did their ancestors find in 
communicating so much? Numerous authors consider this advantage to be “obvious” 
and “enormous”. If so, the problem of the evolutionary emergence of language 
amounts to explaining why none of the other primate species evolved anything even 
remotely similar to language. What I propose here is to reverse the picture. On closer 
examination, language resembles a losing strategy. Competing for providing other 
individuals with information, sometimes striving to be heard, makes apparently no 
sense within a Darwinian framework. At face value, language as we can observe it 
should never have existed or should have been counter-selected. In other words, the 
selection pressure that led to language is still missing. The solution I propose consists 
in regarding language as a social signaling device that developed in a context of 
generalized insecurity that is unique to our species. By talking, individuals advertise 
their alertness and their ability to get informed. This hypothesis is shown to be 
compatible with many characteristics of language that otherwise are left unexplained. 
Keywords: altruism; conversation; evolution; language; relevance; social display; 
social signals. 
 
 
 
Human language bears little resemblance to other primate communication, if only 
by the magnitude of its characteristics (vocabulary size, volume of exchanges, 
amount of time devoted to it, intricacy of structure, variety of messages). Accounting 
for its existence in Homo sapiens has been presented as one of the most important 
(Bickerton 2009) and difficult (Premack 1985; Christiansen & Kirby 2003b) 
scientific questions. Why is the emergence of language such a conundrum? If, as 
many authors claim, language is a good thing to have, there must have been a 
selection pressure for acquiring it. Any general advantage (e.g. insulation when 
temperatures go down) acts as an evolutionary attractor. If such a long range 
selection pressure existed for language, why were other primate species immune to 
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it? How can we otherwise explain that the selection pressure for language was local 
enough to concern a few hominin species exclusively?  
The purpose of the present paper is first to pose the problem in explicit terms. Many 
discussions about the evolutionary emergence of language rely on implicit 
assumptions concerning evolutionary mechanisms that contradict each other. The 
first section will illustrate this problem by reviewing the various reasons that are 
invoked when regarding language as “obviously” advantageous. The second section 
will put the issue in the perspective of the opposition between macro- and micro-
evolution. Then, the various ‘reasons’ why language evolved will be confronted with 
the reality of language behavior. This will leave us with a new conundrum: it seems 
that there should have been a selection pressure against language as we know it! Or, 
in other terms, the selection pressure that led to language is still missing. At that 
point, I will suggest that language evolved in the presence of a form of insecurity 
that is unique to our species. Being informed became a social value, and language 
developed as a tool to advertise it. 
1. Is language “obviously” a good thing to have? 
Some authors consider that the selective advantages of language are “enormous” 
(Chomsky 1975, pp. 40; 2002, p. 148; Hurford 1991a, p. 172; 1991b, p. 293; Penn, 
Holyoak & Povinelli 2008, p. 123; Brinck & Gärdenfors 2003, p. 495; Vyshedskiy 
2014, p. 315) or “considerable” (Bradshaw 1997, p. 100; Savage-Rumbaugh & 
Lewin 1994, p. 249). For instance: 
“So if one organism just happens to gain a language capacity, it might have reproductive advantages, 
enormous ones.” (Chomsky 2002, p. 148) 
 “Language gives humans an enormous advantage concerning co-operation in comparison to other 
species. We view this advantage as a strong evolutionary force behind the emergence of symbolic 
communication.” (Brinck & Gärdenfors 2003, p. 495) 
“Even in primitive form, such a system of communication would have had considerable survival 
advantages” (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994, p. 249.) 
The advantages brought by language are moreover regarded as “obvious” by many 
authors (Bickerton 1990, p. 156; Berwick & Chomsky 2015, p. 87; Blackmore 1999, 
p. 99; Blythe & Scott-Phillips 2014, p. 393; Chomsky 1982, p. 46; Donald 1999, 
p. 148; Ghazanfar & Takahashi 2014, p. 544; Jerison 1973, p. 405; Lieberman 
1992, p. 23; Nowak & Komarova 2001; Pinker 1994, p. 367; Pinker & Bloom 1990, 
p. 712; Wilkins & Wakefield 1995, p. 162). For instance: 
“[…] it is just extraordinarily unlikely that a biological capacity that is highly useful and very valuable 
for the perpetuation of the species and so on, a capacity that has obvious selectional value, should be 
latent and not used.” (Chomsky 1982, p. 46) 
“The immediate, practical benefits that hominids would have gained from communicating with one 
another in even the simplest form of protolanguage are obvious enough.” (Bickerton 1990, p. 156) 
Vocal language represents the continuation of the evolutionary trend towards freeing the hands for 
carrying and tool use that started with upright bipedal hominid locomotion. The contribution to 
biological fitness is obvious. (Lieberman 1992, p. 23) 
“The adaptive significance of human language is obvious. It pays to talk.” (Nowak & Komarova 2001) 
There is a fantastic payoff in trading hard-won knowledge with kin and friends, and language is 
obviously a major means of doing so (Pinker 1994, p. 367) 
It is obvious, then, that language is a good thing to have, both for us as individuals and for our species 
as a whole. (Ritt 2004, pp. 1-2) 
Other authors qualify the advantages of language as “clear” or “uncontroversial” 
(Allott 1992, pp. 106-107; Christiansen, Dale & Ellefson 2002; Christiansen & 
Ellefson 2002, p. 338): 
It seems clear that humans with superior language abilities are likely to have a selective advantage 
over other humans (and other organisms) with lesser communicative powers. This is an 
uncontroversial point [...] (Christiansen & Ellefson 2002, p. 338) 
These judgments about the virtues of language are in apparent contradiction with 
the difficulty of explaining why human beings evolved it. As Burling puts it, we may 
wonder how “we get from an ordinary primate that could not talk to the strange 
human primate that can't shut up” (Burling 2005, p. 4). Burling acknowledges the 
fact that the advantages brought by language may seem obvious to linguists or 
primatologists, but nevertheless the selective pressures that fostered verbal 
complexity should not be taken for granted (pp. 182-183). If language is an 
evolutionary marvel, we must still explain why it did not evolve in other primate 
species (Hurford 1999; Számadó & Szathmáry 2006). As a recent book title asks, 
“Why only us?” (Berwick & Chomsky 2015). One possibility is that a selection 
pressure for developing linguistic skills existed in the biological or ecological context 
of humans (or hominins) but was absent in the context of other ape species. The 
next section will explore this possibility. 
2. Language as a local evolutionary attractor 
2.1. Natural or cultural selection 
Most (but not all) scholars concerned with the origin of human language regard 
natural selection as the main reason that brought human language to existence. 
The above quotations (see also section 4) mention a variety of reasons why language 
would have been selected. Some other authors, however, do not consider that 
natural selection may provide any relevant account of the reasons why language 
faculties emerged in the first place. Crucial aspects of the language faculty would 
have emerged in their definitive form just by chance, instead of having evolved 
gradually through the continued action of natural selection (Bolhuis et al. 2014; 
Chomsky 1975; Tattersall 1998). However, these authors still suppose that the 
universality and the persistence of language in our species result from its selective 
advantages (Chomsky 2002, p. 148), which may include improved thinking and 
improved reasoning in addition to better communication (Berwick & Chomsky 2015, 
pp. 80, 84). 
Natural selection is rightfully irrelevant to authors who do not hypothesize the 
existence of a specialized biological faculty of language. The idea that language 
behavior would be a cultural habit like writing or playing chess began to be widely 
accepted in the nineteenth century as language ceased to be regarded as a godsend 
(Formigari 1993, p. 150). Its modern proponents consider that crucial aspects of 
language, such as the ability to process syntax and the willingness to talk, owe their 
existence to culture. This economy of hypotheses concerning biological endowments 
specific to language can be found in comparative psychology (Tomasello 1999a, pp. 
44, 208; 1999b, p. 526; 2003, p. 109), in anthropology (Knight 2000; Noble & 
Davidson 1996, p. 214; Schoenemann 2005; Tattersall 2014), in linguistics 
(Deutscher 2005, p. 19; Dor 2015, p. 190; Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, p. 649), in 
biology (Jablonka, Ginsburg & Dor 2012), in neuroscience (Arbib 2005, p. 107 and 
up to a point Deacon 1997, p. 339), in philosophy (Sterelny 2006) and in computer 
modeling (Christiansen & Chater 2008; Kirby 2000; Steels 2000, p. 2). From the 
perspective of most of these authors, language (or languages) did emerge through a 
selective process, though not through a biological one. Cultural selective forces 
range from vertical transmission and easiness to learn (Christiansen & Chater 
2008; Kirby 2000) to cultural selection (Jablonka, Ginsburg & Dor 2012) and 
communicative efficiency (Christiansen & Chater 2008, p. 543). The comparison 
with the evolution of writing offers a description of what cultural selection may 
achieve: 
We suggest that just as literacy has done during historical time, early language evolution involved 
socially learned and constructed alterations, adjustments and improvements in communication signs 
and structures, which came together through historical–cultural evolution. (Jablonka, Ginsburg & Dor 
2012, p. 2153) 
Most of the observations that will be made in this section rely on the sole fact that 
some selective mechanism has been responsible for the emergence of language as 
we know it, regardless of the biological or cultural nature of the selection. The only 
alternative to selection is random drift. Random changes in the absence of selective 
forces are unlikely to produce anything structured, so we will exclude the absence 
of any selective mechanism from our discussion of language emergence. We will 
mainly consider the case of biological evolution, but many of our observations 
should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of cultural evolution. 
2.2. Evolutionary peak shift 
The first observation we can make about selection is that it produces local optima 
(Hansen 1997). If language competence, as will be assumed here, results from a 
selective process, then it must be optimal in some ways. A superficial 
understanding of this statement may lead to the kind of criticisms that have been 
(sometimes rightfully) addressed to the so-called adaptationist program. Two 
fallacies should be avoided (Gould & Lewontin 1979). The first one is to believe that 
every natural feature must be optimal. By definition, selective mechanisms do not 
act on neutral features. Moreover, most solutions achieved by selection are a trade-
off between conflicting constraints (e.g. generation simplicity vs. parsing tractability, 
or learnability vs. expressivity), so features may be found to be imperfect for one 
criterion in isolation. The second fallacy consists in believing that optima produced 
by selection should be global. Optima are always local. This means that no 
improvement can be obtained through small changes, independently from any 
judgment of sub-optimality one may pass from a global and ex-post perspective. 
Since selection produces local optima, let’s suppose that the human species with its 
ability to master language is located on such an optimum1. Figure 1 illustrates the 
situation. It shows two local optima. The one on the right (point H) represents the 
situation of language in the human species. The y-axis may represent any 
distinctive feature that would distinguish human language from other forms of 
animal communication. Here, I represented the amount of information shared 
among individuals. The chosen dimension is supposed to be correlated with 
(biological or cultural) fitness. Note that the figure is just a sketch: scales should 
                                       
1 Note that the species is never what natural selection optimizes. Natural selection optimizes relative 
reproductive success within the species. A set of features is locally (Pareto-) optimal only as far as no 
slight change of these features in some individuals can increase their reproductive success. 
not be taken too literally. The purpose of this drawing is just to make a logical point 
concerning the transition from non-language to language. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of an adaptive landscape related to language. 
In this simplified view, non-language is represented by some typical ape 
communication system (primate species may differ substantially in their 
communicative behavior, but we may ignore these differences here for our 
discussion about human language). The question is then whether ape 
communication (let’s say, chimpanzee communication) is better represented by 
point A1 or by point A2 in Figure 1. If we remember that selection generates local 
optima, A1 should be the solution. However, A2 is probably more akin to popular 
views concerning the position of human language in the world of animal 
communication. If, as suggested by the above quotations, language is such a good 
thing to have, one may be tempted to believe that other ape species would have 
evolved it if only given enough time. This thesis was put forward by Sue Savage-
Rumbaugh at the Paris Evolang Conference in 2000 and is illustrated by the title of 
her book, Kanzi: the ape at the brink of the human mind (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 
1994). The only way of supporting A2 against A1 consists in invoking the slowness 
of evolutionary processes. According to this view, evolution admittedly tends to 
produce local optima, but due too its incredibly low speed, no wonder that most 
species would just be trying hard to find their way to these optima. The slowness of 
evolution is sometimes used as an argument in the context of language emergence 
(de Duve 1995, p. 403; Tomasello 1999a, p. 204; Worden 1998, p. 150). These 
judgments concerning the slow speed of evolution are generally unsupported and 
might result from the confusion between micro- and macro-evolution. 
Micro-evolution means ‘evolution under selection pressure’. It is a hill-climbing 
process that corresponds to the transition A2  H in Figure 1. It is governed by 
Darwinian laws (or some other selective force for processes such as cultural 
selection). Micro-evolution is a rapid process. Observations (Thompson 1998) and 
simulations (Dessalles 1996) show that biological change under selection pressure 
can happen in a few dozens of generations. Even if we allow for hundreds of 
generations, significant change can occur in a few millennia for a species like ours. 
Such duration can be considered instantaneous in comparison with the time scale 
of hominin phylogeny. Computer scientists take advantage of the speed of micro-
evolution in techniques like genetic algorithms (Goldberg 1989; Dessalles 1996). 
The high speed of micro-evolution is due to a phenomenon that John Holland 
named ‘implicit (or intrinsic) parallelism’ (Holland 1975). Various mutations are 
‘tried’ in different individuals or lineages in parallel; the most successful ones 
replicate; thanks to genetic recombination (crossover), they have some probability of 
ending up together in a same genome; individuals endowed with this genome 
inherits valuable traits that have been selected in several of their ancestors 
independently. This phenomenon of implicit parallelism explains why evolution 
under selection pressure is significantly faster than if mutations had to accumulate 
one after the other in a single lineage. 
Macro-evolution, on the other hand, is a slow process. The macro level is 
characterized by the phenomenon of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge & Gould 1972). 
This phenomenon is the unavoidable consequence of the action of a rapid selective 
process. In an idealized view, species rapidly evolve and end up sitting on a local 
optimum. They may remain there in equilibrium an indefinite amount of time. Then, 
for whatever reason such as some improbable mutation, some individuals discover 
a neighboring local optimum. A burst of micro-evolution follows, which corresponds 
to a punctuation in Eldredge and Gould’s schema. This process results in a peak 
shift, such as the transition A1  H in Figure 1.  
This peak shift phenomenon is not the only possibility at the macro-scale, as the 
‘adaptive landscape’ may change through time, due to environmental or ecological 
perturbations (Estes & Arnold 2007). In this case, the species is expected to follow 
the local adaptive optimum as it moves. We may call this process moving peak 
tracking. 
According to this simplified description of evolutionary change, major modifications 
would result either from hill-climbing (evolution under selection pressure), adaptive 
peak shift or moving peak tracking. Things may be of course more complex, and 
when averaged over very long periods, adaptive changes merge into a combination of 
the three processes (Estes & Arnold 2007). However, if we focus on one single 
qualitative change such as the transition to language, we must decide which of hill-
climbing, peak shift and peak-tracking offers the best account. 
Due to the high speed of micro-evolution, we can rule out the hill-climbing scenario. 
A primate species located at a point like A2 in the adaptive landscape (Figure 1) 
would have evolved a communication system resembling language (point H) in a few 
hundreds or thousands of generations. This means that non-human primate 
species are in equilibrium (as illustrated by point A1) and are unlikely to be evolving 
toward more language-like communication. The transition to language therefore 
appears as a genuine macro-evolutionary event. 
The peak-tracking scenario could in theory produce an evolutionary path to 
language: slowly changing conditions would have brought hominin species to evolve 
communication systems looking more and more like language. Though this 
possibility cannot be ruled out, it remains quite unlikely. It would presuppose that 
language is no more than an amplified version of ape communication, and that at 
each step during its evolution, the amplification factor would have been fine-tuned 
to the ‘needs’ of the time. These alleged changing conditions play the role of a non-
parsimonious external cause that led evolution on a definite track. In the absence of 
any proposal for such environmental conditions that would have led to language by 
repeated adaptive amplifications of primate-like vocalizations, the peak-tracking 
scenario remains unsupported. 
The peak-shift scenario is the last remaining option: Language can only be a local 
attractor. This conclusion is at odds with traditional descriptions that invoke some 
long-lasting evolutionary trend toward larger brains (Schoenemann 2006), greater 
intelligence and eventually language (Lieberman 1992, see above quotation). In 
principle, ‘evolutionary trends’ do not occur at the macro-evolutionary level and are 
only possible during the ephemeral micro-evolutionary bursts. Macro-evolution is 
apparently unpredictable and non-directed; it has no inertia and no memory. As 
Gould (1996) convincingly demonstrated, a species has no means to remember 
where it was coming from as it reached its current equilibrium. This conclusion 
conflicts with anthropocentric views of evolution that would regard language as an 
absolute advantage towards which all other mammal species are slowly striving to 
evolve.  
2.3. Preadaptations 
Repeated peak shifts may have produced what can still be regarded with hindsight 
as some sort of evolutionary trend toward language. The idea consists in imagining 
that hominin species, while hopping from one adaptive peak to another, as do all 
species, fortuitously came close to a situation where language became evolvable. 
Reading this ‘success story’ in retrospect would give an illusion of evolutionary 
trend. The intermediary steps are often called ‘preadaptations’ (Christiansen & 
Kirby 2003a; Hurford 2003a; Wildgen 2004). Numerous candidates have been 
proposed, including some brain rewiring (Wilkins & Wakefield 1995), the ability to 
control the vocal tract (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994), the ability to combine 
meaningless sounds (Sereno 2005), the ability to use symbols and to combine them 
(Deacon 1997), the mastery of conceptual complexity (Schoenemann 2005), the 
ability to process recursive structures (Berwick & Chomsky 2015; Chomsky 1975), 
the ability to imitate (Arbib 2005; Donald 1999; Zlatev 2014), the ability to share a 
focus of attention (Tomasello 2003; 2006), the ability to read others’ beliefs and 
desires (Baron-Cohen 1999), the mastery of complex social relationships (Cheney & 
Seyfarth 2005; Worden 1998), an increase of social group sizes (Dunbar 1996), the 
existence of widespread cooperation (Nettle 2006) or a major social organization 
shift (Knight 2008). 
The very notion of preadaptation comes with two requirements: that the 
preadaptation was hard to evolve, and then that language was easier to evolve once 
the preadaptation was installed. This hard-before-easier-after scenario is however 
questionable on both sides. Let’s consider the ‘hard-before’ side. The name 
‘preadaptation’ presupposes that the corresponding quality evolved independently 
from language, rather than being a consequence of it. But why did the 
preadaptation evolve only in our lineage? Merely asserting its “obvious” advantages 
deepens the mystery instead of solving it. 
Mimesis would have provided obvious benefits, allowing hominids to expand their territory, extend 
their potential sources of food, and respond more effectively as a group to dangers and threats. (Donald 
1999, p. 148) 
After having invoked a preadaptation (such as Donald’s mimesis) that is unique to 
hominins, one needs two independent evolutionary accounts instead of one. The 
situation illustrated in Figure 1 has to be repeated twice, first to explain why the 
transition to the preadaptation occurred only once, and then to explain how 
language could evolve from the preadaptation. In particular, one must show how the 
preadaptation is locally optimal and why non-human primates did not evolve it. The 
difficulty augments of course if one imagines that several of these preadaptations 
were necessary for language to eventually emerge. Postulating preadaptations 
should therefore be done with parsimony and as the last resort.  
Preadaptations make sense only if they made the emergence of language more likely. 
They are generally claimed to have “cleared the way” for its evolution or, 
alternatively, their absence would have “prevented” other species from evolving 
language: 
[About increased orofacial motor control and enhanced social intelligence] These two innovations, 
conspicuously absent in nonhuman primates, may have been crucial to clear the way for the emergence 
of language in modern humans. (Slocombe & Zubenbühler 2005, p. 1783) 
The conclusion is thus that it is the lack of bodily mimesis […] that prevents non-human creatures from 
evolving both cumulative culture and language. (Zlatev 2014) 
In most cases, preadaptations are presented as conducive to language, as if a 
breach in the firewall surrounding the language adaptive peak had been opened. 
The diversity of candidates should alert us about the lack of support for such 
hypotheses: each would-be preadaptation must be shown to be the decisive one, at 
the exclusion of all other candidates. In this respect also, proposing a preadaptation 
for language appears difficult and should not be done lightly. 
To summarize, the transition to language is necessarily a macro-evolutionary event, 
due to the speed of micro-evolution. As a consequence, it is impossible or, at best, 
non-parsimonious, to speak of an ‘evolutionary trend’ toward language. Language 
must be a local evolutionary attractor, and nothing predestined our lineage to evolve 
it. Figure 1 might be somewhat misleading in this respect. The transition from A1 to 
A2 and then to H may appear inevitable in the long run, as there is only one great 
adaptive peak in A1’s vicinity. This conclusion, of course, corresponds to no reality 
and would just result from an ex post bias. One should rather imagine that the A1 
peak is surrounded by many other adaptive peaks at various distances and various 
heights in a high-dimensional space. The fact that only one dimension and one 
neighboring peak are featured in Figure 1 is just for the sake of simplicity.  
This observation that language is not the outcome of some long-ranging 
evolutionary trend comes with several corollaries. Various features of primate 
communication seem to bear non-trivial resemblance to human language. For 
instance, two meaningful signals may be combined to mean something new (Arnold 
& Zuberbühler 2006; Ouattara, Lemasson & Zuberbühler 2009). Due to the 
inexistence of long-term evolutionary trends, such features, whatever their interest 
as instances of convergent evolution, should not be analyzed as precursors or 
embryonic forms of the corresponding language features. No species can be 
regarded as an imperfect ‘draft’ in anticipation or in the direction of the human 
species. This holds for apes, but also for hominin species such as Homo erectus or 
Homo ergaster. Nothing predestined them to become sapiens. 
Another consequence of the locality of macro-evolutionary attractors is that 
contrary to what is sometimes asserted (Schoenemann 2005), we should expect a 
modular architecture of the language faculty. Each past species was in equilibrium, 
which means that each of its selected features was locally optimal. If, as suggested 
by Derek Bickerton (1990), Homo erectus used protolanguage to communicate, then 
protolanguage must have been locally optimal for its function. Protolanguage was 
not a draft of language and did not announce it. The succession of equilibria lets us 
expect qualitative differences between successive species, each step being fully 
functional. An analogy is offered by open-source computer programs that come with 
various additional and successive modules or add-ons. One may choose to add new 
functionalities and to get rid of old features. Similarly, new behavioral 
characteristics emerging in a biological species after an adaptive peak shift are 
expected to correspond most of the time to qualitative, not quantitative, changes. 
Darwin famously claimed that “the difference in mind between man and the higher 
animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind.” (1871, ch. IV). 
Though Darwin was certainly right to think that all intermediary forms did exist at 
some point in time2, there is no reason to conclude, as he apparently did, that every 
difference must be quantitative. In the case of language, the fact that changes might 
have been gradual (Christiansen & Chater 2008, p. 503; Corballis 2014; Gibson 
1994; King 1996) does not entail that the outcome is only quantitative variation. 
Nature offer numerous examples of qualitative innovations produced through 
gradual change. A peak shift like the A1  H transition (Figure 1) predicts 
qualitative change: some previous characteristics that were positively selected in A1 
may have lost their adaptive value, while new characteristics that were neutral or 
detrimental become advantageous at point H. If language evolved through several 
adaptive peak shifts, as suggested by the protolanguage hypothesis, then we should 
expect several qualitative differences between human language and other ape 
communication systems. We consider some of these differences in the next section. 
3. The strangeness of human language 
Some of the most remarkable facts about language are relative to the way it is used. 
These facts are rarely considered in evolutionary accounts, despite their relevance 
to the issue of language origin. One reason is that linguists generally choose to split 
the language faculty into a linguistic component (anything up to context-
independent meaning) and a communicative component, and quite often choose to 
ignore the latter. I consider the dichotomy artificial, as it may obfuscate the 
functional dependencies between the different modules that make up the language 
faculty. Moreover, choosing to ignore language use is like studying the heart while 
obstinately refusing to consider the way it pumps blood. This attitude is regrettable, 
as some facts about language use might well turn out to be the key to 
understanding why language emerged in our species. Table 1 lists some of these 
facts. As we will see, many of them turn out to be hard to explain. 
                                       
2 Some authors suggested (Chomsky 1975; Bickerton 1990) that the transition to language was due 
to some single improbable mutation that would have generated qualitative differences in one single 
step. Even if correct (despite being improbable), this kind of hypothesis is irrelevant to our 
discussion which deals with the adaptiveness of language. The question of why the mutation has 
been successful would remain. 
Table 1. Facts to be explained about human communicative behavior. 
SPADV For language to exist, speakers must get some advantage from speaking.  
COST Language is a costly apparatus and a costly behavior. 
INCONS Many topics addressed in spontaneous conversation are about 
inconsequential matters. 
OFFER Human beings are talkative. They speak more than ten thousand words 
per day on average, often in a competitive way, striving to be heard. 
VOCAB Individuals acquire plethoric vocabularies. Adults understand tens of 
thousands of different words. 
NOAUDEX People willingly talk to various audiences, even to people they don’t 
know, and most often to several people simultaneously, with little 
audience exclusion. 
GEN Language is a generalized behavior: very few people refrain from talking 
and remain systematically silent. 
GDRN Language is gender neutral. Women and men show similar 
conversational behavior. 
ABNORM Events reported in spontaneous conversations are most often about 
abnormal situations, i.e. events or states of affairs that are presented as 
unexpected by speakers. 
POINTING Young children spontaneously point to unexpected situations, even 
before they acquire language. 
SYNTAX All human individuals are able to master languages that use central 
recursion. 
PRED Meaning is in part expressed in predicative form. 
 
Speakers’ advantage. Many accounts of language existence highlight the benefit 
that listeners may get from acquiring information, while ignoring that language can 
only exist if speakers have some incentive to speak. 
Cost. The cost of language may be overlooked if one focuses on marginal costs 
exclusively. The energy required to utter one single sentence is indeed negligible. 
This should not hide the fact that language means a huge investment for human 
beings (Miller 2000, p. 360). Costs include the amount of time devoted to it: 
language activity takes up from one fifth to one third of one’s waking time (Dunbar 
1998; Mehl and Pennebaker 2003). These impressive figures reveal that far from 
being a marginal habit, language is central to any human life, from nearly birth to 
death. Language also requires considerable time and sometimes risks to acquire or 
generate relevant information (Miller 2000, p. 360; Reio Jr. et al. 2006). Humans 
must also bear the cost of having a low larynx (Lieberman 1992) and the cost of 
supporting a large brain (Aiello 1997) to memorize hundreds of thousands of past 
experiences worth telling (Dessalles 2007a) in addition to the content of past 
conversations (Norrick 2000). 
Inconsequentiality. What do people do with words? Classical philosophical essays 
(Austin 1962; Searle 1969) suggested that language is primarily used to perform 
actions. Observation of spontaneous language offers a different picture. Some 
authors studied spontaneous language (i.e. casual conversation occurring ‘in the 
wild’, under uncontrolled conditions) and paid attention to the content of 
conversations, to what people talk about. Their work reveals several surprising facts 
which are at odds with the idea that language would be an action-oriented tool. 
First, many topics are about futile matters that are inconsequential to participants 
(Dunbar, Duncan & Marriott 1997). For instance, they may talk about a soccer 
team playing in the third division having reached the semi-finals of the national 
Cup (my own corpus, 12.04.2000) or they may wonder which animals do eat hot 
chili pepper in the wild (my own corpus, 26.09.2000). We will see that the 
inconsequentiality of human chat is one of the facts that are particularly hard to 
explain. Another fact revealed by the observation of spontaneous conversation is 
that people mostly talk about past situations, especially during narratives 
(Dessalles 2017; Mahr & Csibra, to appear; Norrick 2000; Tannen 1984). During 
story rounds (Tannen 1984, p. 100) people recount past events one after the other, 
each story triggering the next one. Narratives represent 40% of topics in a corpus of 
family conversations I analyzed (Dessalles 2017). This amount matches other 
estimates (Eggins & Slade 1997). This form of past-oriented declarative speech 
departs from theories in which language would appear as an action-oriented 
behavior. 
Competitive offer. Language is a disproportionate behavior. Individuals speak 
about 16,000 words on average per day, while some may reach 45,000 (Mehl et al. 
2007). Narratives, arguments and opinions are spontaneously and massively offered 
during conversation, most of the time without any prompting. This readiness to 
offer information for free is also observed in technical forums and social networks 
(Ariely 2008, p. 89; Kwak et al. 2010). It is also characteristic of the scientific 
publication system. The readiness to talk has been compared to a competition in 
which individuals strive to be heard (Dessalles 1998; Miller 2000, p. 350). 
Vocabulary. Vocabularies are plethoric. Average individuals understand tens of 
thousands of different words (often from two of more languages) that they learn at 
an impressive rate during childhood (Goulden, Nation & Read, 1990).  
No audience exclusion. Verbal interactions are far from being systematically 
dyadic; whenever possible, individuals speak to three or more (Dunbar et al. 1995), 
with little or no audience exclusion (Miller 2000, p. 350). 
Generalized behavior. Observations across various cultures reveal that virtually all 
individuals engage in talking (Dunbar 1998). The distribution of the number of 
words spoken per person per day reveals that the vast majority of people do talk 
(Mehl et al. 2007). 
Gender neutrality. Language is in first approximation gender neutral. Both sexes 
engage in conversational activities, with no quantitative difference (Mehl et al. 2007; 
Redhead & Dunbar 2013) and at best only slight qualitative differences that may 
depend on local conditions (Aries & Johnson 1983; Tannen 1994). 
Abnormal situations. The observation of spontaneous conversation reveals that 
people systematically talk about abnormal situations.  
“We would intuitively reject such introductions as ‘Let me tell you something ordinary that happened 
yesterday…’ A narrative that is in fact judged to be ordinary may be rejected after it is told by 
expressions equivalent to ‘So what!’” (Labov & Fanshel 1977, p. 105) 
Situations worth talking about have to be “problematic” (Ochs et al. 1992), “different 
from ordinary experience” (Labov & Fanshel 1977, p. 105), “unexpected, deviant, 
extra-ordinary, or unpredictable” (van Dijk 1993), “abnormal” (Schank 1979), “odd 
or unexpected”, ”rare”, “impossible or unheard of”, be “the violation of a norm” 
(Polanyi 1979), “be a low probability event”, “depart from expectations” (Agar 2005; 
see also Davies 1971). Even when exchanging about weather conditions, 
interlocutors feel obliged to frame trivial observations as abnormal events 
(unusually long rainy period, erroneous forecast, high temperature for the season). 
Unexpectedness or abnormality requires that the situation depart from expectations. 
For instance, one would not expect a third-division team to reach the semi-finals of 
the national Cup; or one would not expect any animal to enjoy eating hot chili 
pepper. The notion of unexpectedness has been formalized3 (Dessalles 2013) and 
makes correct predictions about acceptability and interest in conversation 
(Dessalles 2017). 
Declarative pointing. Bickerton (2009) challenges theories of language emergence 
to explain the usefulness of the very first dozen of words. But even before that, we 
should be able to explain the existence of pointing behavior. All human beings, 
including children by the age of twelve months, draw attention to unexpected events 
using for instance declarative pointing (Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello 1998, p. 58). 
Apes may point, but only in an imperative way to get food for instance (Pika & 
Liebal 2006; Tomasello 2006). Apes are curious, but they don’t apparently share 
their curiosity, or at least not systematically, contrary to humans. 
Syntax. One of the most celebrated differences is the human ability to process 
central embedding (recursion). In the preceding sentence, the noun phrase ‘central 
embedding’ is included in the verb phrase ‘process central embedding’ which is 
itself embedded in the noun (or determiner) phrase ‘the human ability to process 
central embedding’. The resulting structure is best represented as a binary tree that 
may grow from any of its branches. This tree may be the apparent outcome of a 
dynamic process based on operations such as merge (Chomsky 1995). Every 
healthy human individual is able to process central recursion in language, while 
there is little evidence that non-human species can.  
Predicates. Language conveys meaning. Let’s consider the sentence:  
The sister of the colleague you met yesterday is a chess champion. 
The meaning of this sentence has several dimensions, including a perceptual one 
(the addressee may have formed an image of the colleague, and perhaps could ‘see’ 
the woman playing chess). It is also tempting to offer a formal representation of the 
sentence’s meaning, as in this Prolog4 translation: 
                                       
3 Unexpected situations require complex circumstances to occur. For instance, a third-division team 
can only reach the semi-finals of the national Cup thanks to a complex conjunction of favorable 
circumstances. Unexpected situations also require a small amount of information to be distinguished. 
For instance, the same event would appear less unexpected, and thus less interesting, if it occurred 
in a foreign country that needs to be specified. These two factors can be characterized using the 
notion of ‘minimum description length’. See www.simplicitytheory.science for definitions, examples 
and references.  
4 Prolog is a computer language based on predicates and variables. Variables start with a capital 
letter. All occurrences of the same variable within a clause refer to a same value (which may be 
unknown). 
meet(you, C, yesterday), colleague(C, me), sister(S, C), champion(S, chess). 
This translation makes use of predicates: meet, colleague, sister and champion. The 
nature of these predicates has been widely discussed in linguistics, in philosophy 
and in computer science. A commonly shared opinion is that predicates predate 
interpretation, and even pre-exist in fixed form in the mind, as elements of a 
language of thought. The ad hoc choice of predicates in the preceding example and 
their proximity to linguistic expression should make us suspicious about this 
idealized perspective 5 . I submitted the idea that predicates are not permanent 
representations and may be formed on the fly at the time of interpretation (Dessalles 
2015). The important fact for our present discussion is that the sentence of our 
example translates quite naturally as a bag of predicates. This kind of 
representation can be directly used by a Prolog interpreter to draw inferences and 
perform reasoning.  
The ability to form predicates can be regarded as a fundamental cognitive ability of 
our species, even if some other species are sometimes granted with an embryonic 
version of it (Hurford 2003b). Predicates (or the ability to generate them) fulfill two 
functions that are linked to the communicative role of language. One of them is to 
receive an attitude such as (dis)belief, desire, undesirability, unexpectedness. The 
attitude is generally carried by the predicate that lies on top of the syntactic 
hierarchy. In our example, it would be champion(lucy, chess). The other function of 
predicates is to support determination. If you do not know lucy, I can replace her 
name by a variable (S in the example) and use another predicate, sister(S, C), to 
help you determine who I am talking about. And then I can use yet another 
predicate, meet, to help in the determination of the newly introduced variable C. 
This process is a recursive one, occurring at the semantic level. Syntactic recursion 
can be seen as a tool for expressing predicates that are recursively used for 
determination6 (Dessalles 2007b[2000], pp. 213-6). 
Even if we restrict the explanandum to the short list of Table 1, determining which 
selection pressure could lead to a communication behavior with these 
characteristics remains complicated, as we will see. 
4. Is language evolutionarily unstable? 
According to Terrence Deacon (1997, p. 377), “Looking for the adaptive benefits of 
language is like picking only one dessert in your favorite bakery”. Deacon then 
mentions a dozen from “the myriad of advantages” that better communication offers, 
including organizing hunts and planning warfare. The purpose of the present 
section is not only to question the reality of all these alleged advantages, but even to 
offer a reversed picture in which the reason why language was selected in the first 
place will appear as a genuine mystery. 
                                       
5 One clear description of a language of thought based on pre-existing predicates has been offered by 
Jerry Fodor (1975). Surprisingly, Fodor himself fought hard to reject the possibility that the language 
of thought could be anything like an ontology based on definitions or on relations (Fodor 1998; see 
also Ghadakpour 2003). 
6  The underlying mechanism relies on semantic linking (Dessalles 2007b[2000], p. 216): if two 
phrases are syntactically connected, then the corresponding predicates must share a variable. With 
this mechanism, and contrary to Prolog, variables such as C or S in the example can remain 
unspoken. 
The functions that are supposed to make language beneficial, as "obvious" as they 
might be (see section 1), vary from author to author. They can be organized in 
several broad categories that are listed in Table 2. The table shows the various 
incompatibilities between the selective scenarios and some of the facts mentioned in 
the previous section. A ‘+’ sign means that the scenario can be claimed to correctly 
predict the feature, whereas a ‘–’ means that it wrongly predicts its opposite. ‘0’ 
means that the scenario is compatible with the feature but does not predict it. 
The point of the present discussion is not to dismiss these scenarios as outright 
wrong, but rather to draw attention to the fact that they cannot be claimed to be 
“obvious”. Most of them would require significant amendment to only be considered 
as potential accounts for the existence of language. Let us comment on this table’s 
lines. 
Table 2. Compatibility of language characteristics with selective scenarios 
Characteristic 
Model 
 SPADV  COST  INCONS  OFFER  VOCAB  NOAUDEX  GEN  GDRN  ABNORM  POINTING 
Collective benefit – – – – 0 + + + 0 0 
Coordination + 0 – – – – + 0 – – 
Reciprocity + – – – 0 – + + 0 – 
Kin selection + + – – – – + 0 0 0 
Manipulation + + – 0 0 – + + – – 
Improved thinking  – – – – + + + + 0 – 
Social networking + + + 0 – + + + – 0 
Sexual signaling + + + + + – + – – – 
Social signaling + + + + + + – + 0 + 
 
4.1. Collective benefit 
Many accounts of the existence of language invoke some form of collective benefit, 
either at the group level or at the species level: it would be good to share useful 
information to increase everyone’s knowledge about the material world (Allott 1992, 
p. 107; Baumeister & Vohs 2002, p. 675; Corballis 2014, p. 51; Corballis and 
Suddendorf 2007; Deacon 1997, p. 377; Györi 1997; Pinker and Bloom 1990; Ritt 
2004, p. 1; Santibáñez 2015; Sterelny 2012, p. 76; Szathmáry & Számadó 2008 p. 
40-41). To be eligible as an evolutionary explanation for language, a supposed 
function must bring an adaptive advantage. More than that, one must show that 
language corresponds to an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This means that 
non-speaking (or less-speaking) individuals cannot do better than average in a 
speaking population. Few of the authors who regard language as “obviously” 
advantageous (see section 1) did consider this constraint. This is especially true 
when we consider the many scenarios based on collective benefit in relation to the 
speaker’s advantage constraint (SPADV). These scenarios wrongly predict that 
speakers would benefit from remaining silent and from merely taking advantage of 
others’ information. This constitutes a special case of the so called ‘Tragedy of the 
commons’. Scenarios that value information pooling consider that information has 
material value. Giving away useful information for free is therefore an altruistic act. 
An information pooling population would be invaded by free-riders who benefit from 
accessing pooled information without contributing to it. Scenarios merely invoking 
collective benefit do not, as they stand, explain how language behavior can be an 
ESS. Most other scenarios have been imagined by authors precisely to overcome 
this difficulty. 
Some theoretical models such as group selection (Wilson & Sober 1994) or gene-
culture interactions (Choi & Bowles 2007; Richerson & Boyd 2005) show that 
collective benefit may have an evolutionary impact. These models produce relatively 
weak selection pressures and require strong discrepancies between groups. They 
can hardly been invoked to explain the emergence of language, not only because 
human groups or cultures do not differ regarding language use (Dunbar 1998), but 
also because language is costly (Table 1). The COST constraint is a problem for any 
account based on collective benefit: costs endured by individuals should be 
compared, not with a share of the collective benefit, but with the variation of that 
share induced by their participation (Sumpter & Brännström 2008). Participating in 
a collective effort is profitable only in the presence of a strong leveraging effect, 
when the marginal return of this participation outweighs its cost. There is virtually 
no such leveraging effect in the case of language. Individuals who would unilaterally 
stop contributing to collective knowledge would still benefit from the same 
information pool. 
The information pooling scenario faces a further difficulty with the INCONS constraint. 
The scenario relies on the fact that information has some material value. The fact 
that human conversation is replete with inconsequential topics is at odds with the 
idea that shared information is so valuable and would benefit group members to 
such an extent that it would compensate for the cost of language. Even more 
mysterious is the OFFER constraint. “People compete to say things. They strive to be 
heard.” (Miller 2000, p. 350) This makes no sense within any of the ‘information 
collectivism’ scenario. 
4.2. Coordination  
In coordination situations, participants switch from a disorganized equilibrium to 
another Nash equilibrium that benefits each of them (Skyrms 2004; Sumpter & 
Brännström 2008). Language would help in this transition (Bickerton 2009; Brinck 
2004; Carruthers 1996, p. 231; Gärdenfors 2004; 2006; Nowak and Komarova 
2001; Sterelny 2006; Snowdon 2001; Tallerman 2014, p. 322). Does language fit in 
with this role of facilitator? If language were geared to organizing action, human 
conversation topics would be mainly about immediate or future plans. This is not 
what we observe. Most conversation topics are not instrumental (Redhead & 
Dunbar 2013) and deal with past situations (Dessalles 2017; Dunbar, Duncan & 
Marriott 1997; Mahr & Csibra, to appear; Norrick 2000). The scenario also conflicts 
with the INCONS, OFFER, VOCAB and NOAUDEX constraints: conversations should deal 
with serious matters, words would be few and show little variety (Burling 1986; 
Redhead & Dunbar 2013), and they should be directed to action partners 
exclusively. Lastly, the fact that most conversation topics are about abnormal 
situations (ABNORM, POINTING) makes little sense within the coordination scenario. 
4.3. Reciprocity 
Language has often been described as a form of cooperation (Grice 1975) and 
conversely cooperation is often invoked to account for the advent of language. In a 
loose sense, cooperation may refer to one of the previous scenarios, collective 
sharing and coordination. Otherwise, cooperation means reciprocity. Reciprocal 
interactions are dyadic situations in which both partners would benefit from 
cooperating but would get a better short-term payoff by unilaterally defecting. 
Considerable research efforts have been devoted to finding conditions in which 
reciprocal cooperation can be stable (Hammerstein 2003; Nowak 2006). Are these 
conditions relevant to language? 
As soon as one considers that language conveys useful information, one may 
wonder why speakers would willingly provide such information for free. One 
tentative solution is to consider language exchanges as forms of iterated reciprocity 
(Fitch 2004; Hurford 2007; Pinker 2003). This idea conflicts with several facts about 
language (Table 2). Reciprocity is only possible when the benefit of cooperation 
exceeds by far the cost of cooperating. The high costs associated to language (COST), 
the fact that many verbal interactions are apparently futile (INCONS), the fact that 
individuals compete to speak rather than to listen (OFFER) without significant 
audience discrimination (NOAUDEX) make little sense if language is some sort of 
information barter. According to the reciprocal schema, overtalkative individuals 
should be highly appreciated while sporadically speaking ones should be excluded 
from future conversations. Talking about inconsequential topics should be 
sanctioned and knowledgeable people (including academics) would be the target of 
endless requests from the crowd to deliver their wisdom. Most contexts (including 
academics) offer the converse picture: people strive to be heard or read. On the 
listeners’ side, information may often have a negative price: one is ready to support 
a cost not to receive it (think of advertisement or spams). And when feedback is 
provided, it is most often to criticize rather than to thank the speaker (Dessalles 
1998; 2017). Reciprocal cooperation may not be what language is about after all 
(Scott-Phillips 2007). 
This does not preclude the possibility that language may be a useful tool to handle 
the problem of free-riders in reciprocal cooperation by contributing to the emergence 
of reputations, and that it may have evolved for that reason (Dunbar 1998; 1999; 
Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Smith 2010). People do indeed comment on cooperative 
and uncooperative actions, which is part of their gossiping activity (Dunbar 1996; 
Dunbar, Duncan & Marriott 1997). Reputations of honesty and reliability would be 
at stake during daily chatter (Scott-Phillips 2011). Language acts, from this 
perspective, would be meta-cooperative, as they would serve policing purposes. But 
meta-cooperation faces the same problems as cooperation itself: why bother helping 
others by warning them about third-parties’ uncooperative actions (Power 1998), 
why so willingly, why with so many words, and why so often by commenting on 
inconsequential acts? 
4.4. Kin selection 
Altruistic facts represent a puzzle for Darwinian theory. Organisms should be 
concerned with their own success rather than enduring cost to increase others’ 
success. Unless those others are relatives. One way to explain why individuals feel 
the urge to provide information to other individuals is to say that language owes its 
existence to kin selection, either because it was primarily used to teach offspring 
(Arbib 2005, p. 114; Castro et al. 2004; Fitch 2004) or because its main purpose is 
to provide hard-won knowledge to close relatives (Lieberman 1992, p. 23; Pinker 
1994, p. 367). One problem with these ideas is that hunter-gatherers live in bands 
in which genetic relatedness is low, too low for kin selection to operate (Hill et al. 
2011). Another problem is that kin selection can hardly been invoked to explain why 
language exists at all today. Conveying information that is useful to offspring or 
relatives requires neither to be talkative (OFFER in Table 2) nor to use tens of 
thousands of distinct words (VOCAB) (Burling 1986; Dunbar 2003, p. 220). People 
would not teach futile matters (INCONS) and communication would not be 
predominantly among non-kin (NOAUDEX). Imagining the possibility that language 
began to evolve through kin selection in the first place is of little help to understand 
why it still exists now. 
4.5. Manipulation 
Language can be used to manipulate others’ mind and behavior. Unlike animals, we 
can affect the social and physical world without moving from our chair, merely by 
using words and by bringing other people to do or believe what we wish them to do 
or to believe. Did language evolve for this reason (Crespi 2008; Sperber & Origgi 
2005)? As suggested in Table 2, this proposal is not fully convincing. If the purpose 
of talking is to influence others’ actions, we should ration our words to speak 
exclusively to people who can do something tangible for us. This does not fit with 
the inconsequentiality of our daily conversations (INCONS) and the fact that we are 
ready to talk to many people whose actions do not affect us (NOAUDEX). The fact 
that conversations deal primarily with abnormal states of affairs (ABNORM) makes 
little sense if the aim is to influence others’ beliefs and actions on our behalf. 
Declarative pointing in young children (POINTING) can hardly be analyzed as some 
kind of manipulation either (in contrast to imperative pointing). 
4.6. Improved thinking 
It has been suggested that the novel cognitive abilities underlying language were 
initially selected, not for their role in communication, but because they dramatically 
improved reasoning abilities (Chomsky 2002, pp. 76, 148; Reboul 2007). This 
assumption leaves several aspects of language unexplained (Table 2). If language 
originated as an internal cognitive process, why did language become public at all 
(SPADV), why devote so many resources to this public output (COST), why should 
individuals talk so much and in a competitive way (OFFER) about inconsequential 
subjects (INCONS) that are systematically abnormal (ABNORM)? Why do even young 
children show this communicative behavior (POINTING)? The problem with this 
internal-first scenario is that it puts us in a situation of explaining two miracles 
instead of one. It seems more parsimonious to regard the human particular 
reasoning abilities as a consequence of language rather than as a preadaptation for 
language. In particular, ‘deliberative’ reasoning bears all the hallmarks of a by-
product of our argumentative competence rather than the other way around 
(Dessalles 2007b[2000], p. 306; Mercier & Sperber 2011). 
4.7. Social networking 
Language is almost by definition a social behavior. One talks with other individuals, 
preferentially friends. Human beings form coalitions as many social primate species 
do, but in our case, this is achieved mainly through language (Burling 1986; 
Dunbar 1996). Did language evolve as a tool to establish and maintain social 
bonds? According to Dunbar, language replaced grooming in that role. This 
hypothesis as it stands still falls short of a convincing account. It does not explain 
the many thousands words of our vocabularies (VOCAB in Table 2), let alone the 
syntactic and semantic complexities of human languages. At the extreme, it seems 
that synchronized grunts could do the job of binding coalitions together. The social 
networking scenario certainly needs additional hypotheses to be compelling7. 
4.8. Sexual signaling 
Geoffrey Miller (2000) championed the idea that language emerged through sexual 
selection. Our male ancestors would have used language to advertise their 
intellectual abilities. Our female ancestors would have adopted language as well, 
but to be able to understand males’ performances and also to create enduring 
couple relationships (Miller’s ‘Scheherazade’ hypothesis). In this scenario, language 
is more a display device than a way of exchanging tangible information. This 
explains why topics need not be consequential (INCONS in Table 2). However, the 
scenario is prone to many criticisms (Fitch 2004). Language should not appear 
before puberty during development (POINTING) and linguistic abilities of males and 
females should differ quantitatively and qualitatively (GDRN). Men would talk only to 
women and conversely (NOAUDEX). And the systematic mention of abnormal 
situations in spontaneous conversations (ABNORM) is left unexplained. 
4.9. Social signaling 
Social signals are any conspicuous features or behaviors that are displayed to 
attract coalition partners. The idea that apparently altruistic acts are in fact signals 
that serve the performer’s interests was introduced by Amotz Zahavi (1975; Zahavi 
& Zahavi 1997). Sexual signaling is one instantiation of this idea. Another is social 
signaling. Within Zahavi’s framework, these signals are evolutionarily stable if they 
are reliable indicators of a social quality, i.e. a quality that individuals want to find 
in friends. For instance, mobbing behavior in birds can be interpreted as a way for 
individuals to advertise their readiness to take risks for the defense of the group 
(Zahavi & Zahavi 1997; Maklakov 2002). Some mechanisms of ‘social selection’ 
(Nesse 2009) are close to the social signaling schema. Can we interpret language as 
a way of displaying some social qualities to attract social partners? Showing that 
language is a social display device would be a step toward solving the paradox of its 
apparent altruistic aspect. It would even explain the competitive offer of information 
(OFFER in Table 2). Various proposals have been made in this direction. For instance, 
speakers would gain social status by being eloquent or by talking relevantly (Burling 
                                       
7 Dunbar proposed such a hypothesis by highlighting the importance of gossip. Burling proposed a 
social signaling role for language. These hypotheses are discussed in the subsections on reciprocity 
and on signaling. 
1986; Dessalles 1998; Henrich & Gil-White 2000). The social signaling scenario 
faces two main difficulties. One is to explain the audience’s motivation to pay 
attention to signals emitted by speakers and grant them status for that reason 
(Henrich and Gil-White suggest that the audience would be eager to learn from 
authoritative information sources, but this conflicts with the INCONS and OFFER 
constraints). Another difficulty that has been rarely mentioned comes from the 
winner-take-all effect (figure 2): best performers get the most part of the social 
benefit and there is no incentive for the crowd to participate in the signaling game 
(Dessalles 2014). As a result, only a minority is expected to spend time and 
resources in talking (GEN in Table 2). 
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Figure 2. Winner-take-all effect in a social signaling competition. Arrows indicate the quality of friends 
that individuals will make at equilibrium, depending on their own quality (Dessalles 2014). 
We just reviewed a few influential scenarios that have been invoked to account for 
the existence of language in our species. Again, the point is not to prove them 
definitively wrong, but rather to show their limits as they stand. The situation at 
this point is that no satisfactory account of the emergence of language is yet 
available. The selection pressure that led to language is still missing. 
We considered the possibility mentioned by many authors that some preadaptations 
may have facilitated the advent of language in our lineage. Unfortunately, these 
preadaptations do not make the characteristics listed in Table 1 any easier to evolve. 
For instance, most commonly mentioned preadaptations do not explain why 
children, contrary to apes, systematically point to unexpected stimuli (Table 2, last 
column). Tomasello explains the difference with apes by invoking a specific 
preadaptation, namely the human ability to establish joint attention, an ability that 
apes would lack. The explanation has its limits. Apes and monkeys are perfectly 
able to take the presence of conspecifics into account when emitting alarm calls 
(Zuberbühler 2006). If there had been a selection pressure for evolving it, 
declarative pointing would have emerged in chimpanzees, at least as an automatic 
behavior. But it did not, probably because referential communicative acts require 
some level of trust (Knight 1998; Power 1998) that is absent from the competitive 
social world of chimpanzees (Hare & Tomasello 2004). As we can see, the very 
notion of preadaptation is of little help to explain the emergence of language, even in 
the embryonic form of declarative pointing.  
The lesson of Table 2 is not only that language is left unexplained, but that it 
shouldn’t even exist! Language as we know it should have been counter-selected. 
Each minus sign is Table 2 means a selection pressure in the opposite direction. 
Even if language had emerged as a cultural habit (Tomasello 1999a), biological 
evolution would have favored individuals refraining from using it the way human 
beings do. In other words, language seems to be evolutionarily unstable! Or perhaps 
some piece is missing in the puzzle. The next section proposes to combine the two 
best candidates of Table 2, namely the social networking and social signaling 
scenarios, to reach a convincing candidate for the missing selection pressure. 
5. Language as a social signaling device 
The hypothesis that will be further explored now is that language evolved as a form 
of social display. This idea comes naturally to mind once one realizes that human 
speech is preferentially directed toward acquaintances and that friends’ most 
regular activity is chatter (Dunbar 1996). Individuals establish social bonds or 
decide to break them based on the interestingness of their social partners’ 
conversation. The human form of communication stands out by its costs and its 
exaggerated amplitude (Table 1) among primate communication systems. This also 
points out to some kind of signaling.  
After Zahavi’s (1975) initial proposal, several successive models (Grafen 1990), 
(Gintis, Smith & Bowles 2001), (Dessalles 2014) proved the consistency and the 
robustness of the signaling mechanism. In all these models, individuals are 
represented by agents that differ by some quality. This quality remains concealed 
but may be revealed by sending a signal. Sending the same signal level is supposed 
to be more costly for low-quality individuals than for high-quality ones. In social 
signaling games, agents benefit from establishing bonds with higher-quality 
individuals. It is therefore in their interest to pay attention to quality-revealing 
signals, and it is in the interest of signalers to invest in those signals, even if they 
are costly, as it is the best way to attract allies. At equilibrium, high-quality 
individuals turn out to be the most intense signalers (Gintis, Smith & Bowles 2001). 
This means that signals become reliable indicators of qualities. 
This mechanism offers new explanations for various situations of apparent altruism 
in animals (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997) and for the existence of prosociality in humans 
(Bliege Bird & Smith 2005; Hawkes 1991; Hawkes & Bliege Bird 2002; Lyle & Smith 
2014; Palmer & Pomianek 2007). Though the role of language has sometimes been 
evoked in relation to social signals (Knight 2008; Smith 2010), the possibility that 
language itself could be a social signaling device has rarely been considered (if we 
except the case of sexual signaling, see above). Some time ago I proposed that 
language was used to advertise one’s ability to be relevant (Dessalles 1998). If the 
social signaling schema is correct, then relevant speakers would get social status 
(Burling 1986). Unfortunately, this schema does not work because of the 
aforementioned winner-take-all effect (figure 2). This effect characterizes any social 
signaling situation in which affiliations are unconstrained. One extreme example is 
the Twitter social network in which some individuals may attract millions of 
followers while the vast majority of users have less than a dozen of active followers 
(Kwak, Lee & Park 2010). Large social networks are not monolithic. They are segmented 
into a multitude of communities sharing some common interest. The winner-take-
all effect is however expected to operate in each of these communities, as long as 
affiliations are unconstrained: eventually, a minority of individuals will attract most 
of the followers by investing significantly in communication, while the majority will 
be unable to match the same level of signal and will be discouraged from signaling. 
This schema does not describe language as we know it. Virtually all people do talk 
(Mehl et al. 2007). If language is a competition for relevance, how can we explain 
that most individuals still strive to make verbal contributions, knowing that they 
cannot outcompete those who are able to entertain any audience with their brilliant 
conversation? 
More recently I was able to design a model in which generalized social signaling 
emerges and remains stable (Dessalles 2014). The crucial assumption is that social 
bonds imply sharing time together. This time-sharing constraint tends to make 
relationships symmetrical. When two agents A and B meet, a negotiation takes 
place. A considers accepting B as friend, based not only on the signal sent by B, but 
also on the amount of time B offers to share (or, equivalently, based on the rank A 
may occupy in B’s list of friends: best friend, second best friend…). B performs the 
same computation, and if A and B come to an agreement, they become friends. This 
may result in some older friend being displaced in A’s or B’s list of friends. The 
apparent quality displayed through signals is no longer the only criterion for 
forming alliances. Individuals base their choice on each other’s ‘social offer’, which 
corresponds to signaltime (signal multiplied by the amount of time offered to share). 
Under the time-sharing hypothesis, agents benefit from establishing alliances with 
relevant individuals, not the most relevant ones, but the most relevant among the 
available ones. Due to the time-sharing constraint, social competition rapidly leads 
to assortativity: the most relevant individuals become friends with each other, the 
second most relevant individuals become acquainted among themselves as well, and 
so on. Even the least relevant individuals have a chance to form social relationships 
with individuals like themselves (Figure 3). This emerging order has a consequence: 
each individual benefits from investing in communication to attract social partners.  
Q quality
signal
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Figure 3. Assortment in a time-sharing signaling competition. At equilibrium, individuals become 
acquainted with individuals of similar quality (Dessalles 2014). 
Thanks to the time-sharing assumption, there is no longer any winner-take-all 
effect. No one can get millions of friends as there is not enough time to give to each 
of them. Competition on the social market generates assortativity (Figure 3). Signals 
are moreover reliable indicators of quality. They end up being an increasing function 
of quality8, and so the quality can be retrieved from the signal (Dessalles 2014). This 
provides the first schema in which a whole population of individuals finds an 
interest in investing in costly social communication, rather than just a minority of 
them.  
Does this time-sharing version of the signaling model offer a plausible (though 
simplified) image of the role of language? The answer depends on whether its 
hypotheses do apply to human societies: 
- Do friends share time together?  
- Do we observe social assortativity? 
- Is language performance involved in the selection of friends? 
- Which are the social qualities advertised by language performance? 
- How are theses qualities related to survival and reproduction? 
5.1. Time-sharing 
Time sharing among friends is commonly observed among primates, in fission-
fusion social organizations (Kummer 1997; Sueur et al. 2011). Populations split into 
smaller units on a regular basis, typically to secure access to food. Individuals 
                                       
8  The optimal social signal s(q) that an agent with quality q emits at equilibrium is given by 
s(q) = q P(q)/C, where C is the cost coefficient (what it costs to increase signal intensity by one unit) 
and P(q) is the payoff provided by affiliating with other agents with similar quality q. The equation 
relates the variation of the signal to the variation of the payoff in a quite simple way. If individuals 
have time for only one friend, optimal signals increase as the square of quality. For several friends, 
the curve is more complicated but the overall shape remains similar (Dessalles 2014). 
actively choose with which other members of the same population they will spend 
the next hours or days. Hunter-gatherer societies are organized according to a 
similar schema. Individuals choose partners on a daily basis to forage and on a 
monthly basis to form camps (Marlowe 2005). In our modern societies, the sharing 
of activities is also crucial in friendship (Douvan & Adelson 1966). Dunbar (1996) 
drew attention to the analogy between language and grooming. Both activities are 
time consuming. By their very nature, they are reliable indicators of the fact that 
social partners do spend time together. 
5.2. Assortativity 
Social assortivity is manifest in human societies (Verbrugge 1977). Friends tend to 
be matched by age, education and occupational prestige. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether these correlations, rather than being a mere consequence of 
proximity, result from the search for mutual interest (or relevance) in verbal 
interactions (Aries & Johnson 1983). Many people hold certain individuals they do 
not know personally in high esteem, for instance celebrities. No doubt they would 
like to become acquainted with these valued figures if only they could9. However, 
due to the limitation of social time to share, individuals in great demand can only 
accept a few friends, and eventually friendships concern individuals of similar 
status. 
5.3. The role of language in friendship 
As intuition suggests, there is a strong correlation between friendship closeness and 
the frequency and quality of language interactions (Dunbar 1996; Eagle, Pentland & 
Lazer 2009). Friends may speak about any topics, but close friends are more prone 
to exchange intimate and emotional experiences (Aries & Johnson 1983; Rimé 2005, 
p. 130). Superficially, the correlation may seem to result from a mere reinforcement: 
we are more likely to speak with friends as we share time with them, and we are 
more likely to getting acquainted with people we happen to talk to. This description 
at surface level is hiding the fact that a genuine social selection operates during 
language interactions. People choose each other based on the relevance (or interest) 
of their conversation. We seek the company of people who are able to stir up our 
interest and conversely we tend to turn away from individuals whose conversation is 
repeatedly boring or trivial. Failures in connecting topics or ideas are regarded as 
pathological (Meilijson, Kasher & Elizur 2004) and expose individuals to social 
exclusion. 
5.4. Qualities advertised by language performance 
The signaling model relies on the assumption that language is used to display 
qualities. What are they? I proposed that the purpose of human conversation is to 
advertise one’s ability to be relevant (Dessalles 1998). In our species, relevance and 
interest are primarily linked to unexpectedness and abnormality (section 3). What is 
                                       
9 In previous analyses (Dessalles 1998), I considered a reified version of social status and tried to 
make it the outcome of language interactions: individuals would grant a bit of social status to 
relevant people. This schema proved to be a non-starter. The present model focuses on the relation 
between being relevant and chances of establishing social bonds. Social status becomes nothing 
more than an emergent property: the status of some individuals emerges from the wish of many to 
become acquainted with them. 
at stake in spontaneous conversations is not the topic itself, which is most of the 
time inconsequential to the participants (Dunbar, Duncan & Marriott 1997). Many 
situations, even the most inconsequential ones (e.g. a third-division team reaching 
the semi-finals) can be used as an excuse to signal something unexpected. It seems 
that the proximal purpose of language is to point to abnormal situations and 
discuss about them, whatever the subject matter. During story rounds (Tannen 
1984, p. 100) individuals literally compete for recounting unexpected events, and 
during discussions, participants compare their ability to deal with problematic 
issues (Dessalles 2016; 2017). 
The dimension of abnormality seems to be systematically present in spontaneous 
conversation topics. However, another dimension may amplify interest and 
relevance: the ability to share emotion about the situation which is recounted or 
discussed (Rimé 2005, p. 114). Not only do people use language mostly to elicit 
surprise and emotion, but their audience enjoys being surprised and emotionally 
moved (Rimé 2005, p. 177). 
What speakers demonstrate during verbal interaction is the ability to deal with 
abnormality, either by pointing to it or by discussing about it. Since information can 
be defined in terms of unexpectedness10, we can say that individuals advertise their 
informational abilities. For the signaling model to apply to language and depict it as 
a social display mechanism, we must now understand how this abnormality-
oriented signaling activity is related to survival and reproduction, both on the 
speaker’s side and on the listener’s side. 
6. The missing selection pressure: one candidate 
Table 2 suggests that none of the common evolutionary scenarios can explain, not 
only the emergence, but also the persistence of language as it exists in our species. 
In the previous section, we considered the possibility that language could be an 
instance of social signal. Individuals would advertise their informational capacities, 
i.e. their ability to deal with abnormal situations by chatting about them. This 
proposal ticks all the boxes: it explains why individuals have an incentive to talk 
(SPADV) competitively (OFFER) to anyone (NOAUDEX), even if it requires time and 
efforts (COST), since it is a way for them to build their social network; it explains why 
people talk quite often about inconsequential matters (INCONS), since the point is to 
deal with abnormality, taking every opportunity to do so; tanks to the time-sharing 
hypothesis, all individuals have an incentive to enter the signaling competition (GEN, 
GDRN); the use of plethoric vocabularies (VOCAB) is in part explained by the fact that 
unexpected situations are by definition rare and need precise descriptions to be 
distinguished (Briscoe 2006). 
One crucial feature remains to be explained: why does human conversation 
systematically deal with abnormal states of affairs (ABNORM)? Why do human beings 
find an interest in establishing social bonds with individuals who are best able to 
point to unexpected, abnormal situations and to discuss about them? This question 
constitutes the keystone of the signaling model of language. Finding an adequate 
                                       
10 Shannon’s definition of information refers to surprise, which is quantified using the improbability 
of events. This definition has been extended within the Algorithmic Information Theory framework 
and is quantified as abnormal simplicity (see Dessalles 2013). 
answer proved harder than anticipated, until the hypothesis that we will consider 
now emerged as a natural answer. 
6.1. Why are abnormal situations relevant? 
To explain why human conversations are systematically abnormality-oriented 
(section 3), I propose to start, not from a hypothesis, but from a fact. At some 
(unknown) point in the hominin history, individuals started using weapons to 
commit risk-free homicide. This mere fact must have had dramatic consequences on 
earlier social organizations. 
In normal circumstances the possession by all men, however physically weak, cowardly, unskilled or 
socially inept, of the means to kill secretly anyone perceived as a threat to their own well-being not only 
limits predation and exploitation; it also acts directly as a powerful levelling mechanism. (Woodburn 
1982) 
We are the only social lineage in which risk-free killing became possible. Any 
previous social organization based on coercion collapsed with such an option offered 
to all members. The event generated a political singularity. It did not only provoke a 
transition to egalitarian societies (Boehm 1999; 2008), but also a complete change 
of survival strategy. Almost overnight, hominin individuals represented a mortal 
danger to their group mates. Human violence, as observed in various culture 
including hunter-gatherers, is characterized by less aggression (Wrangham, Wilson 
& Muller 2006) but a similar death rate in comparison with apes (Gómez, Verdú & 
González-Megías 2016), due to massive intra-group interpersonal homicide with 
only one perpetrator (Fry & Söderberg 2013; Hill, Hurtado & Walker 2007). The date 
of the weapon singularity is unknown, but it is suspected to have occurred early in 
the hominin ancestry (Sala, Arsuaga & Pantoja-Pérez, 2015). 
The weapon singularity has rarely been acknowledged as a crucial event in hominin 
history (see however Bingham 2001). Far from being a banal episode on the route to 
Homo sapiens, it might well be a bifurcation point that had several decisive 
consequences. One is the social leveling mentioned by Woodburn and Boehm. 
Another one is that individuals become eager to discover hidden facts about each 
other (Locke 2005; 2010). But the most important logical consequence of the 
weapon singularity for our concern here is that criteria for social bonding must 
change. When danger is unpredictable and may come from group mates, from 
friends and even from within the couple, choosing the right social partners becomes 
a question of survival. Ideal friends should help you anticipate danger, they should 
be ready to spend time with you and they should not be themselves a danger to you.  
After the weapon singularity, information replaced muscle: informed friends became 
more valuable than strong ones. Language as we use it could be a remote 
consequence of this shift in social values. By taking any opportunity, even the most 
futile ones, to signal and discuss abnormal situations, people display their ability to 
spot potential danger. People we find interesting are those who are able to surprise 
us by recounting unexpected events. Individuals who are best able to demonstrate 
their vigilance by doing so attract more social interest than individuals who seem to 
know nothing noticeable about the surrounding physical or social world.  
This possible link between the weapon singularity and the emergence of language 
provides a consistent scenario that passes all the tests considered above (Table 2). 
Individuals have a vital interest in sharing time with alert friends who are the most 
capable of anticipating homicide risk. They make every attempt to attract these 
friends by displaying their own ability to spot the unexpected. The missing slot in 
the last row of Table 2 (GEN) is now filled: since protection is only efficient as friends 
spend time together, the time-sharing model applies and all individuals have an 
incentive to display their informational abilities. 
The weapon singularity scenario not only explains why our conversations are 
oriented towards abnormality (section 3), but also why we tend to share emotional 
events with close friends (Aries & Johnson 1983; Rimé 2005, p. 130) and why, 
conversely, we tend to avoid being closely acquainted with people who show no 
emotions or show emotions opposite to ours (Rimé 2005). This fundamental aspect 
of human verbal interactions makes sense within the weapon singularity scenario: 
by revealing the conditions in which they feel emotions, individuals become more 
predictable and appear less likely to represent a danger themselves. 
6.2. From pointing to syntactic language 
The evolutionary scenario outlined in the previous section explains how a new 
selection pressure may have eventually led to language. The transition to language 
is unlikely to have been instantaneous, though. Our languages rely on complex 
recursive structures and on the use of predicates (section 3). Within utilitarian 
scenarios of language evolution, complex features like this seem absurd (Premack 
1985, p. 282; Redhead & Dunbar 2013). What is the selection pressure that led to 
such sophistications, and how are they adapted to the corresponding function? It is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss these issues in detail. My hypothesis is 
that the main selection pressure remained constantly the same: establish protective 
social bonds by advertising one’s ability to anticipate unexpected violence from 
other group members. I proposed that the capacity to form predicates and to reason 
logically emerged in a further step, initially as a protection against lies (Dessalles 
1998). The point is not to insure epistemic quality, as has been suggested (Sperber 
2000; Mercier & Sperber 2011), since most discussions are about inconsequential 
topics. People raise consistency issues publicly through argumentation11, not to 
improve the quality of their own knowledge, but to advertise their ability to 
distinguish genuine abnormality12 (Dessalles 2011a). Once the cognitive ability to 
form predicates was there, syntax then evolved as an efficient means to express 
them (Dessalles 2007b[2000], pp. 216-20). 
 
This paper had two objectives. The first one was to show that determining the 
selection pressure that led to language is a genuine scientific problem which is by 
no means “obvious” and which still remains unsolved. In particular, scenarios 
relying on collective advantage, on coordination or on reciprocal cooperation are 
unable to provide satisfactory answers to the problem. The second objective was to 
propose a logically consistent solution, in which language appears as a social 
signaling device. People would advertise their social value by talking about 
                                       
11 See (Dessalles 2016) for a cognitive model of argumentative competence. 
12 A side-effect of this propensity to denounce inconsistencies is that people can talk about distant 
events with marginally costless signals (Scott-Phillips 2007). I suggested that before the emergence of 
this behavior and of the corresponding abilities, only verifiable (almost-here-almost-now) events were 
worth signaling, and that protolanguage was a locally optimal means to do so (Dessalles 2007b[2000], 
p. 332). 
abnormal situations. Thanks to the time-sharing requirement which comes 
naturally with the protective scenario, we avoid the winner-take-all effect that 
characterizes other social signaling systems. All individuals have an incentive to 
advertise their ability to spot and to discuss the unexpected, as a way to 
demonstrate their skill at anticipating dangerous situations. Human language 
would be a far consequence of an event that did occur in the past of our lineage and 
that I named the weapon singularity. This event provides a clear-cut reason why 
language is unique to our species. 
Several aspects of the scenario can be tested. We can investigate whether human 
conversation is universally oriented toward abnormal states of affairs. I could verify 
for instance that Japanese spontaneous conversation does not significantly differ 
from French conversation in this respect (Dessalles 2011b). We can design 
experiments to show that unexpectedness systematically raises interest in adult 
and in children, independently from consequentiality. We can design experiments to 
contrast what constitutes a surprise in apes and in humans (for instance, are apes 
surprised by coincidences?) We can get some insight into the weapon singularity by 
studying historical or anthropological records about the reaction of societies when 
new weapons such as poison permitting anonymous killing were introduced, or by 
observing the way people adapt their social network when the protection of law 
disappears. We can also investigate whether various cognitive components 
underlying language competence (quantification/determination, aspect, tense, 
contrast and predication (Dessalles 2015), abduction, negation (Dessalles 2016)) 
can be shown to be well-adapted to serve the purpose of signaling and discussing 
abnormal situations (for instance, aspectual relations can be crucial to support 
negation, as in the constitution of an alibi, and thus to point to an inconsistency). 
 
One of the most characteristic behaviors of our species, language, still remains an 
evolutionary mystery. Actively and repeatedly drawing other individuals’ attention to 
abnormal states of affairs seems pointless from a Darwinian point of view. What 
benefit do speakers get from doing so? In an attempt to solve this conundrum, I 
suggested that language is not a tool for exchanging useful information, but rather 
a way of displaying one’s ability to acquire information. I showed how human 
conversation behavior can be an evolutionary stable strategy as soon as 
informational abilities are regarded as a social signal, i.e. a signal used to attract 
friends, in a context in which friends share time together. To explain why 
informational abilities play such a central role in hominin societies, I proposed to 
establish a link with the weapon singularity. Far from being an anecdotal episode in 
hominin history, the weapon singularity may be a determining point from which our 
lineage diverged from other primate social organizations. In this new social niche, 
individuals are seeking informed friends and spend hours showing off their own 
informational abilities. Language as we know it may have emerged to fulfill that 
function. 
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